# An Overview of Global Counterspace Capabilities

# And How to Mitigate Them

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### **About Secure World Foundation**

- **SWF** is a *private operating foundation* that promotes cooperative solutions for space sustainability
- **Our vision:** The secure, sustainable, and peaceful uses of outer space that contribute to global stability on Earth
- **Our mission:** Work with governments, industry, international organizations, and civil society to develop and promote ideas and actions to achieve *the secure, sustainable, and peaceful uses of outer space* benefiting Earth and all its peoples

- Existence of counterspace capabilities is not new, but the circumstances surrounding them are
- Significant R&D/testing of a wide range of destructive and non-destructive counterspace capabilities by multiple countries
- Only non-destructive capabilities are actively being used in current military operations

### GLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES

An Open Source Assessment

> 04|2024



https://swfound.org/counterspace



### **Counterspace Capabilities**

**Co-orbital:** weapons that are placed into orbit and then maneuver to approach the target to attack it by various means, including destructive and non-destructive

**Direct Ascent:** weapons that use ground, air-, or sea-launched missiles with interceptors that are used to kinetically destroy satellites through force of impact, but are not placed into orbit themselves

**Directed Energy:** weapons that use focused energy, such as laser, particle, or microwave beams to interfere or destroy space systems

**Electronic Warfare:** weapons that use radiofrequency energy to interfere with or jam the communications to or from satellites

**Cyber:** weapons that use software and network techniques to compromise, control, interfere, or destroy computer systems


**Space Situational Awareness:** knowledge about the space environment and human space activities that enables both offensive and defense counterspace operations



### 2024 Global Assessment

|                                | US | Russia | China | India      | Aus.       | France     | Iran       | Israel     | Japan      | North<br>Korea | South<br>Korea | UK         |
|--------------------------------|----|--------|-------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|----------------|----------------|------------|
| LEO Co-Orbital                 |    |        |       | $\bigcirc$     | $\bigcirc$     |            |
| MEO/GEO Co-Orbital             |    |        |       | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |            | $\bigcirc$ | 0          | $\bigcirc$     | $\bigcirc$     | ightarrow  |
| LEO Direct Ascent              |    |        |       |            | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$     | $\bigcirc$     |            |
| MEO/GEO Direct Ascent          |    |        |       | $\bigcirc$     | $\bigcirc$     |            |
| Directed Energy                |    |        |       | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |            | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$     | $\bigcirc$     | ightarrow  |
| Electronic Warfare             |    |        |       |            |            |            |            |            |            |                | $\bigcirc$     | $\bigcirc$ |
| Space Situational<br>Awareness |    |        |       |            |            |            |            |            |            |                |                |            |
|                                |    | Legend | none  | s 🔵 s      | ome        | significa  | ant 🔺      |            |            |                |                |            |


### ASAT Tests by Year (2024)



### TABLE 5-1 - ORBITAL DEBRIS CREATED BY ASAT TESTS IN SPACE

| DATE            | COUNTRY | ASAT<br>SYSTEM   | TARGET      | INTERCEPT<br>ALTITUDE | TRACKED<br>DEBRIS | DEBRIS<br>STILL ON<br>ORBIT | TOTAL<br>DEBRIS<br>LIFESPAN |
|-----------------|---------|------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Oct. 20, 1968   | Russia  | IS               | Cosmos 248  |                       | 252               | 76                          | 50+ years                   |
| Oct. 23, 1970   | Russia  | IS               | Cosmos 373  |                       | 147               | 35                          | 50+ years                   |
| Feb. 25, 1971   | Russia  | IS               | Cosmos 394  |                       | 118               | 45                          | 50+ years                   |
| Dec. 3, 1971    | Russia  | IS               | Cosmos 459  |                       | 28                | 0                           | 3.3 years                   |
| Dec. 17, 1976   | Russia  | IS               | Cosmos 880  |                       | 127               | 56                          | 45+ years                   |
| May 19, 1978    | Russia  | IS-M             | Cosmos 970  |                       | 71                | 64                          | 40+ years                   |
| Apr. 18, 1980   | Russia  | IS-M             | Cosmos 1171 |                       | 45                | 5                           | 40+ years                   |
| Jun. 18, 1982   | Russia  | IS-M             | Cosmos 1375 |                       | 63                | 59                          | 35+ years                   |
| Sept. 13, 1985  | U.S.    | ASM-135          | Solwind     | 530 km                | 287               | 0                           | 18+ years                   |
| Sept. 5, 1986   | U.S.    | Delta 180<br>PAS | Delta 2 R/B |                       | 18                | 0                           | < 1 year                    |
| Dec. 26, 1994   | Russia  | Naryad-V?        | Unknown     |                       | 27                | 24                          | 25+ years                   |
| Jan. 11, 2007   | China   | SC-19            | FengYun 1C  | 880 km                | 3536              | 2686                        | 15+ years                   |
| Feb. 20, 2008   | U.S.    | SM-3             | USA 193     | 220 km                | 175               | 0                           | 1+ year                     |
| Mar. 27, 2019   | India   | PDV-<br>MK II    | Microsat-R  | 300 km                | 130               | 0                           | 3+ years                    |
| AugDec.<br>2019 | Russia  | Cosmos<br>2535   | Cosmos 2536 |                       | 30                | 14                          | 3+ years                    |
| Nov. 15, 2021   | Russia  | Nudol            | Cosmos 1408 | 470 km                | 1807              | 67                          | Unknown                     |





### State of Multilateral Security Discussions (1)

- No forward movement on space security and stability discussions at the UN for decades
  - Disagreement on nature of the threat and how to respond
  - Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) / No First Placement (NFP) versus nothing
  - EU Draft Code of Conduct
  - 2013 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on TCBMs
  - 2019 GGE on prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS)
- UNGA 75/36: Dec. 2020
  - National submissions to the UNSG on nature of the threat to space, responsible/irresponsible behavior, and possible paths forward
  - See some commonalities emerge: act with due regard, avoid harmful interference, no non-consensual close approaches, no deliberate creation of long-lived debris
- UNGA 76/231: Dec. 2021
  - Created an Open-Ended Working Group to meet four times over 2022 and 2023
  - Goal: come up with recommendations on possible norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviors relating to threats by States to space systems

### State of Multilateral Security Discussions (2)

- Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules, and Principles of Responsible Behaviours
  - Met four times from May 2022 to August 2023; 70 countries participated plus civil society
  - See convergence on many issue areas, including avoiding deliberate creation of debris, need for rules on actions (notifications, consultations) prior to conducting rendezvous and proximity operations, value of TCBMs
- UNGA 77/41: Dec. 2022
  - Calls upon nations to make the commitment not to conduct destructive DA-ASAT missile tests; 155-9-9
- UNGA 77/42: Dec. 2022
  - Calls for no first placement of weapons in outer space; 123-50-3
- UNGA 77/250: Dec. 2022
  - Calls for a GGE to to consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on PAROS (including the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space); 115-47-7
  - Met in November 2023 and finished up August 2024

## **Tools for Improving Communication, Transparency**

- Lexicon for Outer Space Security (https://unidir.org/publication/lexicon-outer-space-security)
  - Intended to facilitate shared understandings of key topics and terms
  - Three types of terms:
    - Acronyms
    - Common definitions
    - Terminology frequently used in space security discussions that could benefit from further clarification
- **Space Security Portal** (https://spacesecurityportal.org/)
  - Interactive map of global space governance landscape
  - Seeks to support informed participation by interested stakeholders and support transparency, information-sharing, and capacity-building



### **Destructive DA-ASAT Missile Test Moratorium**

- April 2022: United States made a commitment not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests, has since been joined by 36 more countries
- Driven partially by November 2021 Russian DA-ASAT test
  - DA-ASAT tests have created some of the largest increases in space debris in the last two decades and have made operating in LEO more dangerous for years to come
- UNGA Resolution 77/41 in December 2022 supporting this moratorium (passed 155-9-9)
  - Brazil was a co-sponsor
- Becoming prevalent in multilateral discussions about responsible behavior in space
  - Many countries feel it is irresponsible to deliberately create debris on orbit
- DA-ASATs are unlikely to be useful as military weapons

### Why a DA-ASAT Missile Test Moratorium Matters

- Destructive ASAT tests create debris that poses a direct threat to future economic activity in space, particularly LEO
  - Raises the costs and uncertainty of operating there
- Debris is agnostic in terms of whose satellites it threatens: it does not matter if the country who held the test is a geopolitical ally or not
- Debris from Russia's November 2021 ASAT test created "conjunction squalls"
  - Affected remote sensing satellites in sun-synchronous LEO
  - Also many close approaches with Starlink satellites
- Helps build towards international consensus on this and to create a stigma against their use in peacetime
- SWF coordinated an industry statement in support of the DA-ASAT missile test moratorium
  - Currently have 49 signatories from 14 countries
  - For more information, please visit: https://swfound.org/industryasatstatement/

Space Industry Statement in Support of International Commitments Not To Conduct Destructive Anti-Satellite Testing

SIGNATORY COMPANIES





### Thanks.

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