SWF CO Norms Resiliency Protection Apr2016
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Mr. Pierre Delsaux:  We want to use this program, Copernicus, which is giving us pictures of the world, actually, but in Europe, we want to do it for many aspects. Maritime surveillance. We believe that's something which is extremely important and we can use this system.
Another important issue in Europe is the issue of migration. I don't need to explain at length why it's important for us. Again, in this context, the information, the data which are available to Copernicus, could be used also to monitor border control. We are already using it to facilitate, to help the external border controls in Europe.
As I told you, we are now in the process of building another system, which is called Galileo, which is a satellite navigation system, so building resilience with a GPS, because we believe in turn if there's a problem with GPS, having a second system is important also for the US, not only for Europe, and vice versa.
Some leading characteristics of the system. First of all, it will contain what we call a "public‑related service," which actually will be a means of communication, which will be limited only to government. That's something we believe is important because it's a way to facilitate communication also, which should be there, and it's really just important.
Second aspect, it will be, as I say, a satellite navigation system which will be open to everybody. But we want to build also some mechanics of authentication. Because we believe that in case of attack in space, having a notification system of Galileo would be something extremely important, and it will be part of the Galileo system.
Galileo should be fully operational by 2020, and already, before the end of this year, we hope to have what we call "ensured services," which is the first phase of Galileo.
Now moving to the second aspect, because I see that you have finished your meal, so I'm just moving to the second aspect, which is, of course, if we want space to achieve results on the ground, we need to make sure that space is also well protected. For Europe, it implies many aspects which are similar to what exists in the US and the other parts of the world.
First of all, we need to have some kind of autonomy. We need to be able to have the technology which is available for UPN, for space. Which also concerns launchers, because if you launch something which is linked to security, you need to be able to do it, and it needs to control the launcher. We believe that's something which is important.
Having some kind of autonomy, independence is important for us, but that's not sufficient. You need also to protect the ground segment. Because of course you have space, but you have also the ground segment.
It's fundamental that you protect the ground segment by all kind of means, which of course could apply to people, but more than this you need to be protected against cyber‑attack. That's something we believe is extremely important.
Third aspect, and it's a slightly different issue but still important as a state, security in space is important. You have so many debris now in space that we need to do something.
Actually, as a European Commission, we are working with member states and we are giving money to the member states to develop systems to try to avoid and to limit the problems caused by debris in space. We believe that's something which is important.
Finally, you need to protect the satellite. You need to make sure that there is not spoofing and so on, so that they are not attacked by people using the satellites or being destroyed by people using satellites. That's something which is extremely complicated.
Again, let's be honest, you send a satellites and you send a satellite for 10, 15 years with the technology which will be one day 10, 15 years old. Those attacking those satellites will use new technology.
How can you cope with this aspect, the difference between the moment you send the satellite and the technology being used in the satellite with the attack which might take place in one particular moment? That's a very difficult issue on which we don't have an answer.
To conclude, because otherwise we would be deprived of any food, I would say, "Space is fundamental to ensure security, but we also should make all efforts to make sure that our space is protected." For that, what does it mean? It means cooperation between everybody.
We need, of course, the defense sector to be involved, we need the government of the nation to be involved, but we need also the private sector. It's a combination of all elements. That's the first aspect.
Second element, as I say, "Space should not be seen in isolation." We should combine space with other means of fighting, protecting people and avoiding threat to security.
The last aspect, which is always there, money. We need to put the appropriate amount of subsidy and money to make sure that we achieve.
But, security, and again, living in Belgium for the moment, and my colleagues also living in Belgium for the moment, when you see the result of terrorist actions, you really believe you need to put the appropriate effort to make sure that you're protected. Thank you very much.
[applause]
Dr. Michael Simpson:  Our next speaker is Erik Eliasen, who's Vice President of the National Security Space Programs, had a career in the Air Force, has done some liaison work with my buddies in the Navy. We're eager to hear your take on some of these important issues. It's all yours, Erik.
Erik Eliasen:  Thank you, Dr. Simpson. Should I use this one?
Dr. Simpson:  Whichever...
[crosstalk]
Woman:  Give us a sec to catch up with your slide show, OK?
Erik:  Sounds good. I did put a couple of slides together. But first let me say, "Thank you," to the Secure World Foundation for inviting me to be a part of the panel. Quite often when we talk about norms and resilience and protection, we all gravitate towards the space segment of our capabilities, and rightfully so. I think there's a lot of money on orbit and we should do that.
I just want to say thanks to the Secure World Foundation for recognizing the ground segment part of that architecture and that's what I hope to talk to you about today.
I guess the second thing I'd like to say is, "I'm already intimidated for the Q and A section, because when I look out on the audience and I see the likes of Admiral Ellis and Dr. Sega and Heeder, Eddie Richardson, and those kinds of friends that I have, I know that they're probably infinitely smarter than I am already sitting here." A little worried about that.
Then I guess the third I'd like to mention on resiliency is, "Something I'd like to be less resilient are my new dress shoes."
[laughter]
Erik:  They are killing me today as I walk around, so looking for a little less resiliency in my dress shoes these days. How we doing on the charts?
Woman:  It's working now.
Erik:  All good?
Woman:  You can direct.
Erik:  Thank you so much. Humor's important, right? As we get going here, again, we're going to really focus on the ground segment, so I'm just going to go ahead and start going. I put the charts together not so much to sell anybody anything today, but to get us all on the same baseline.
Because when we do overlook the ground segment I think we inject a level of ignorance on what's available when we talk about harmonization on the ground and what it can do across systems on orbit. That's really what this is going to help us do, is just get on the same page.
At our company, at SSC, we have four pillars in our business. I represent the Satellite Management Services, which is a commercial ground network focused on servicing our clients. That client base will be shown here in a second. But this chart really shows you where the Satellite Management Services antennas are located today.
A couple of points about our network, and that is, it's not a static network. The idea of norms of behavior, from a commercial perspective, we have to react to the markets. What that means is we cannot be static. We have to remain highly dynamic.
Ground stations come and go within our network, which is probably a fascinating idea to some people in government who've been operating on the same network for 50 years.
The other thing is that it's a multi‑band type of network and that's, again, driven by the customer set. When new capabilities go on orbit, they don't always comply with the ground segment that's in place. We have to grow and meet that market need on our side.
As long as there's a business case that we can achieve, I think it's a very beneficial side and a win‑win for both. Promised you that this is just a highlight of some of our customers. You can see it varies from national agencies. We're baked into the NASA Near‑Earth Network and DLR, JAXA, Airbus. Very international community of customers.
Not to mention the US Air Force, which, I'm very proud of being able to support some very important missions for those folks. On the commercial side too, I think where the US government is going to be able to leverage the likes of Skybox and others as they move forward.
Here we go. Here's the real meat of what I want to get to today, and that is I put some thoughts together just out of my head. Nothing that I can say is proven yet, necessarily, but it's really meant to plant some seeds for tomorrow's discussion as we move forward together.
I think we get caught up quite often in trying to equate resiliency into one other word. We like to put synonyms together and sometimes people talk about resiliency being as robustness, or they talk about resiliency being redundant, or recovery to a new baseline or something like that.
I think it's a function of all those variables. It's a calculus equation. It's not an A‑equals‑B kind of thing. When you integrate that calculus, I think it needs to even be thought of in a mission‑by‑mission case.
We can design an architecture that maybe answers the mail today, but as the dynamic threats evolve, we should be able to integrate or differentiate in a different way and optimize different variables within the calculus of the resiliency equation.
I think resilience sometimes tries to get discussed as an end state, "We have achieved resiliency, congratulations, we're done." I don't know that that's ever the case. I think resiliency needs to be thought of as a continuous process. I'd like to maybe plant that seed for tomorrow's conversation, as well, the day after tomorrow.
Quite often when I talk to customers, they see resilience as something they can put on a contract for a large company to go do. That I don't think is always the case either. I think that you can't define a set of requirements for resilience. A lot of times it has to happen in a conversation. It has to come sideways, from the bottom, and on top.
In my mind, resilience is really just a series of nodes that are working independently at times but working cohesively at other times, when required.
The benefit of this is that when we're working independently, if I'm a node and you're a node and somebody else is a node, we achieve different mission objectives in different ways, and then when we have to bring them together and we work cohesively, infrastructure as a service comes together quite nicely.
But then we need the ability to break apart. Being continuously connected maybe all the time is not in the best interest of any one mission. Maybe it's in the best interest of some missions, but we need to be able to join and disjoin as necessary.
That leads into the next bullet, and that is the over‑connectedness idea. As a ground network service provider, a lot of the customers like to write requirements that require over‑connectedness. That presents its own issues in the world of resiliency, as might be imagined.
When I talk to the Air Force customers that we have, they like to talk about always‑on networks. That's good, always‑on is good, but sometimes the light switch is a better example. We want to flip the light switch and bring the lights on when required, but at the same time we want to turn that light switch off. I think that's an idea that hasn't really been fully baked into resiliency yet.
Moving on to the next bullet, recognizing systems become fragile over time is an important part of the calculus. They break for several reasons. Trying to put harder titanium around existing systems may not be the best resilient answer.
We could probably invent harder titanium, and it would take a lot of money to go do that. But to invent harder titanium and then wrap it around a system and pretend like we're done probably isn't the right answer either.
Finally, in the world of nodes, over‑connectedness and connecting when you can, the international space community needs to work together to protect the natural resources of space for the benefit of humanity.
What I really like about the analogy with space as it applies back to the Navy is that we learned a lot about international law in the open seas and how to behave, the norms of behavior on the open ocean. I think space is there and we can apply a lot of that rule set into this natural resource of space that we share for our entire planet.
Almost done. A couple of problems and challenges on a slide. If you are a government person, or maybe even one of my customers, I would ask that we try not to work the over‑regulation piece too much. Over‑regulation brings problems in the world of unleashing the economic engine of the commercial sector.
We're making progress there. We've seen some ITAR relaxation and that's a good thing. We probably have a fairly good balance right now in the world of ITAR, but let's just be careful not to migrate back into over‑regulation.
Spectrum management, of course, is a big issue. We can talk about that in a very different panel for a long time. Unnecessary bureaucratic approvals also present problems and challenges. Cyber, of course, always needs to be addressed. I think probably everyone here on the panel's going to mention that, so I won't beat that to death.
In the end, space has always been the crucible for innovation. As we do the hard things in space, lots of new ideas and benefits for our community are going to spin off. NASA has proven that more than once.
I can't bring you problems and challenges without bringing you some solutions. I don't know that any of these are solutions, but I do want to maybe plant some seeds out of my head and into yours.
Getting curious is a good way to work on resilience and it's also a good way to work on norms of behavior and protection. To encourage the status quo is to encourage yesterday's thought, so let's get out of that world.
Defy tradition. I can't remember how many times I stood in front of my boss in uniform in his office and he wanted to know why I was outside the lanes a little bit. When we talked about it, I think we finally achieved the safety and security of my job, at least as it was in the present. I'll tell you about those stories at a beer, maybe, some time at the B.
Push the boundaries, goes along with defying tradition. Finally, I wouldn't be a commercial guy if I didn't say, "Know thy customer." They will shape the products and services that you deliver more efficiently than you can. Don't ignore that.
That really captures my thoughts. Thank you for listening. I'm more than happy to discuss these things at a later date and a later time. Thank you to the Secure World Foundation for recognizing the importance of commercial and recognizing the importance of the ground segment. We know that the space segment is important, but a lot of harmonization does happen on the ground. Thank you.
[applause]
Dr. Simpson:  Thank you Erik. As many of us recognize, we've got a small six‑person village in orbit, but most of the people using space and benefiting from it are on planet Earth. There's got to be some way to get that benefit down to us. Thank you for presenting that perspective.
Next person to present a perspective is Lieutenant Colonel Mike Hellmann. Lieutenant Colonel Hellmann is the Assistant Branch Chief of Strategic Planning and Concepts with the German Air Force, giving us a good sense of this whole issue.
Security is very much a strategic planning issue. As I shared with Mike one of my All Star tours during the time I was in the Navy was at Patch Barracks in Vaihingen, Europe, Germany and with EUCOM. I have wonderful memories of not only joint activity but combined activity both in the office and in the officer's club. I'm looking forward to hearing from you, Mike.
Lt. Col. Mike Hellmann:  Thank you very much, Mike. It's an easy nickname, because my name is also Mike, for this kind of introduction.
First of all, I would like to highlight that this is my sixth attendance at the Colorado Springs Space Symposium in a row. I'd like to mention that because a special thanks I want to give to the Space Foundation to rename, between the last five years, the, "National Space Symposium," into a, "Space Symposium," as an international one. Elliott, Ray, thank you very much for this progress.
Also, I'd like to thank the Secure World Foundation for the invitation extended to me to speak and be a part of this panel to address security for space and security from space.
During this week, we've heard a lot of speeches that mentioned that space plays an integral and indispensable role in our daily lives, whether commercial, civilian or military. One outcome for me is that we are faced all the same challenges but all the same opportunities in conducting space activities.
We've heard also in previous speeches about the new trends and growing need for more partnering, for more commercial efforts, for more collaboration efforts. From a German perspective, the foundation for that is free access to space, free realm of action in space.
It is essential for Germany, but not only for Germany, to preserve the peaceful use of outer space as is laid down in the space treaty of '67. Especially for this growing need of private commercial partnering issues, we have to raise the question, "Have we all the regulation, the frameworks, all these norms, standards in place?"
The answer is, "No, we haven't all these things in place, if we compare this with other areas like aviation, or mobility, traffic and so on." Especially, Jeff Bezos mentioned that for his business case, he needs more reliability and liability, a legal framework, a norms regime and standards. In the past couple of years we made some progress from a high policy level.
There's UN guidelines for space debris mitigation and the ongoing negotiations of international Code of Conduct, but this is a really high‑level policy framework we are discussing. I guess all this businesses, to my next, are thinking about other legal frameworks, more detailed, and so those platforms here that we are coming together on building trust and reliability we need to get progress in that respect.
From a German policy perspective, it is for me, as a military, clear that space provides [inaudible 23:53] that enables forces to conduct operations. Also, you mentioned that it's not only a military thing or a military task. It's also for police operations, for aviation, upcoming for aviation, GPS navigation for Galileo is coming, and so space is in no way only for military importance.
It is also for civil and commercial importance. Space touches upon all the security related to us as a sovereign state has and beyond that. That is one of the reasons Germany follows a whole‑of‑government approach to tackle all space‑related challenges.
I'd like to highlight our strategic guidelines laid down in the German space strategy from 2010. The German space strategy calls for three, and from our perspective holistic, strategic guidelines.
Space activities has to be focused on the benefit, we've heard already, and the needs on Earth for humanity. It has to follow principles of sustainability, and also a really important issue is a close European and international cooperation or collaboration. These guidelines apply for civil, commercial and national German security activities. That includes the military as well.
A very real outcome of this German space strategy and thinking mindset, I would say, is the interagency‑driven German SSA Center. General Pototzky mentioned already in the morning panel session, probably you had a chance to follow this. You see a blue circle, yes? This highlighted the two branches, the partners who are running this interagency center.
This is of course the Federal Ministry of Defense, and our partner is the Federal Ministry for Economics and Energy. The beauty of this in Germany is that this department is also the lead within the German government for all space activities, to coordinate all space activities. We have a big partnership within the major players, stakeholders in space in Germany.
The third and fourth pillar you see are the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs, we have a close link to that especially for natural catastrophes or something like that, and the Federal Ministry of Traffic and Digital Infrastructure in Germany, responsible for the insider German position for Copernicus and Galileo.
There's a close link between these four branches, or these four departments. I think it is unique in Europe. We, from the German perspective, go along this pragmatic approach. We hope that we can use this also as a blueprint on an international level.
Only if we talk to each other and we partnering to each other we can build trust, reliability and confidence, and at a certain stage, also transparency, what we have done and what we're doing next.
We as Germans are open for partnering on the international arena. We're very keen to share our experiences and fears on this special governance and trust, reliability things, but not so easy to find ways through. This ends my introductory remarks. I'm open for questions. Thanks, Mike.
Dr. Simpson:  You're welcome.
[applause]
Dr. Simpson:  I think we will move on to Lieutenant General Peña and then we will have questions at the conclusion of General Peña's remarks. Lieutenant General Eduardo Peña is General de Aviación and Comandante del Comando de Combate. [Spanish].
Lt. Gen. Eduardo Peña : [Spanish]. The first thing that I want to say that my speech will be [Spanish].
Man:  [Spanish]. Limited.
Lt. Gen. Peña:  OK. My speech will be on the operational level. Because I'm a late English speaker, I will read all my speech right now. First of all I would like to thank the Secure World Foundation for this invitation and the opportunity to share with this audience our experience at the Chilean Air Force on this relevant topic. Can you hear? Can you hear me?
Man:  Yes.
Lt. Gen. Peña:  I must say that I know such information with the space development but I'm not in the space [inaudible 30:38]. However, the space [inaudible 30:38] is under my command.
I took the responsibility to do this speech for you. Having this discussion which is easy to do in Spanish, and easier in the Chilean language I know it is very difficult to do it in English. Please allow me to apologize in advance because you will sense that I am a slow guy, but really, it's not.
[laughter]
Lt. Gen. Peña:  Today, I might appear to be a little dummy. It's because I wrote the speech thinking in Chilean language, which, by the way, could be the worst language in South America, and then I had to translate to Spanish...
[laughter]
Lt. Gen. Peña:  ...and finally to English. When I start reading it in English, I noticed that something's wrong, so I come back to the Spanish again and do the English. It's very complex process.
[laughter]
Lt. Gen. Peña:  If you can understand what I am telling you at the end of the speech, it will mean that I will be seen a little bit as smart.
[laughter]
Lt. Gen. Peña:  In the operational level, Chilean Air Force had a space program started in the '90s with two satellites, FASat‑Alfa and Bravo. Both were experimental satellites but with an SSTO‑70 platform. This [inaudible 32:23] was conceptually designed to be use in a space model and as a consequence, to begin with the first mass of experts in these satellites.
The second one, FASat‑Bravo, which went into orbit in 1988 carrying a basic payload in order to measure the ozone layer and low‑resolution for [inaudible 32:47] incident.
Before launching Bravo, it was in the process of design, a relevant event took place in France. A satellite, a SIGINT satellite called CERES has a collision with the debris and loss in nominal operation condition. This experience gave us a better picture about the risks of the space operation.
Bravo, as an original phase allowed us to move into an operational stage in which a fully autonomous operation as we know achieved with FASat‑Charlie, an Earth observation satellite that is, right now, in orbit.
Charlie is still working in our space program. We are considering a replacement that we will expect to have in the future called FASat‑Delta. As I said, Charlie is an optical observation satellite. It has a ground sampling distance of 1.45 meters in panchromatic mode and 5.8 meters in multispectral mode.
Organization and image processing capabilities are managed by the Air Force. However, it was considered for a lot of use. That means that also certify requirements are coming from defense, the public, and government.
The image that you have there is one of the biggest open copper mines in the world, Chuquicamata, located in the northern part of Chile. Also, I shouldn't say this, but maybe it's the most contaminated mine of the country. I am sorry for that. They are not working well.
Operating in this space [inaudible 34:43], this is a natural [inaudible 34:45] of the Chilean space operation and it is my intention this afternoon to share the Chilean Air Force Con Ops concerning this relevant topic.
The main three aspects of the space are coming from all perspectives, are International Spatial Relations, secure communication for the Chilean Air Force's spacecraft and the space [inaudible 35:11].
Following the Spatial Relations, we implemented all the action that the international community commands, innovation, analysis, we designed and took an account of the following subjects. The reach of the Russians during the launch, because they are ready to maneuver the satellite in orbit and the Delta B budget to execute the orbiting maneuver at the end of the operational life.
Regarding the spacecraft's secure communication, we have focused to assure fast and [inaudible 35:44] communication by complying with the local and national authority's regulations to avoid competing with a third party. Besides, we are doing [inaudible 35:54] to our surveillance of the electromagnetic spectrum in the ground station surrounding in order to avoid interference that the satellite needs.
Finally, we have the technical capability to respond. In the case of failure or facing a loss of communication, the satellite will be not be a real risk for a spacecraft.
The third main aspect in the space debate is that we would in Chile secure the spacecraft's operation by keeping a portion of our Delta‑B budget to perform collision‑avoidance maneuvers. This activity is made by all space operations groups in a 24/7 daily basis. Considering that we have just one satellite, Delta‑B topic is very relevant subject. It will also be a critical aspect for our procedures.
In the next slide, I will show you information about our experience and challenges. Because we need to be aware about challenges, [inaudible 37:07], we have implemented a bilateral cooperation procedure with the north and specifically with the Joint Space Operations Center.
This procedure allows us to receive conjecture alerts, which, we have already converted into our database and that is in order to have a decision performer or not a collision avoidance maneuver. This decision is also coordinated with the JSpOC to evolve that this maneuver will not cause a new conjecture alert.
In the case of doing a maneuver, we use an efficiency approach. It means that we try to anticipate the scale of the maneuver to keep it nominal or in such a way to make fuel consumption more efficient throughout the space operational life. What we do is try to keep the satellite about the orbit in order to avoid it going down.
As you can see from 2012, collision warnings written has been 51 percent debris, 21 percent rugged debris, 15 percent unknown elements, and 15 percent active satellite. I should recognize that during the challenge design phase we did our own estimation about the amount of collision there is.
We thought that we will not have more than three alerts per year. However, close to the time of launching the anti‑satellite weapon test by China and the collision between the Iridium and Kosmos satellite, this situation changed the space orbit scenario.
This is an example of how a particular event might generate, or an event can change the space situational awareness. Since December of 2011, we have had 39 conjecture alerts and in three of them, it was necessary to execute a collision avoidance maneuver.
As I mentioned before, the compiling of collision avoidance alerts is made up in order to save fuel as much as we can. In this context, until now, we don't have fuel constraints. However, this is another complexity that we must take into account.
The complexity that I am referring is the time. We need, ideally, at least 48 hours ahead of the conjecture alert as a reaction time. As you can see, the time of opportunity is below this margin. If it took too long some days, and you are left.
What can we do in the future? Our approach is based on the international collaboration. As a country of many advantages for the development of space activity in the northern side, we can find one of the driest places of the world with optimum atmosphere condition where [inaudible 40:16] installed astronomic and near‑object tracking system.
In the middle, we have a diversity that can develop software and algorithms and provide the management generated by Earth observation. Finally in the south, we have a great relational position for the pullout or re‑tracking.
The shape and relative position of Chile, plus the space development gives an excellent opportunity to contribute with the space domain awareness. To conclude, I would like to reinforce the relevance of the space security.
We have been in the space since 1998 and we expect to be there in the future. We know subjects such as space securities, specifically [inaudible 41:01] and I can assure you that we will continue to participate and continue for the development in order to do our space operation more secure.
Finally, the most important thought is that we are agreed that the space situation of the world is a global challenge so being consequent with this vision, we as the main space operation in Chile, the Chilean Air Force, are open to contribute to make space a safer place.
Finally, I have a question. Do you understand?
[laughter]
[applause]
Dr. Simpson:  I'm sure all the panel members have questions to ask each other but that's hardly fair since you've come here to be able to hear some of your questions answered. I think the floor is open for questions. Do we have a microphone to circulate or do we need just one?
Woman:  We have two.
[pause 42:11]
Audience Member:  I don't know if I say, "Good morning," or, "Good afternoon," because of the time.
[laughter]
Audience Member:  My question is mainly to Mr. Delsaux. I'll ask him one quick question and he can answer. I'm General Jean‑Daniel Testé from the French Space Command. The new capacity and the new data available from space represent for me some new vulnerability. I will give some example.
First, in our fight against the terrorist group recently we discovered that all the fighting groups use GPS or are equipped with a GPS receiver. Sometimes, we found also that in preparation, there are attacks against our troops with using a Google Maps imagery available on the Internet. How can we cut this kind of threat?
Pierre:  You are saying something, which is of course extremely important that all this information actually is available to everybody. I mentioned Copernicus, which is Earth observation data. Those data are available everywhere to everybody for free.
The European commission is paying for those satellites that we are giving this information away actually. Amazon is making publicity for itself about the fact that those data are available on the Amazon website and you can use them to do anything.
Of course, because it's available for everybody, it's also available for those people who are not willing to use this information for good reason. It's, of course, a very difficult question because what do we do? Do we stop providing resource data to everybody? Then of course, you have the other situation that terrorists are using this kind of information.
Do we stop GPS in some area of the world? If I ask the question like this, you will see that's not the answer. You cannot stop GPS. You cannot stop getting you in the future, at least on a long‑term basis.
Those data which are there are important for many important issues because you need to use those data to control maritime situations, for earthquakes, for many, many good reasons they are being used. Unfortunately, space, as you say, is also part of the threat that we are facing. But the solution is probably to try to find other means to...It's not to stop space, because you cannot stop space.
The solution is actually to try to find other means to avoid the negative use by those terrorist groups or whatever. I know it's difficult. I know your task because I know this example. I've been told about this example. I know, of course, it's a problem for you. Should we stop Google Earth? If you ask the question as a world, unfortunately I don't know the answer. Unfortunately, I don't.
Dr. Simpson:  Another question over here. Where's the microphone? Oh, I'm sorry. You got the mike. OK, that's good. I couldn't see you well behind General Peña.
[laughter]
Audience Member:  My name is Avery Sen with the Toffler Associates. I'd like to get to the issue of resilience in the space system. My question, if I boil it down, is, "How much resilience do we want and where do we really want it?" I'll explain what I mean.
If I'm an individual who owns a satellite, yes, I want the satellite to be resilient. But, if we, as a global community want the entire industry and space environment to be resilient, maybe we don't want resilience at the level of the satellite.
There can be what you might call "fortuitous failures." Creative destruction can enable the next generation of innovation to happen. Where and how might we design this system of resilience as a community to maximize this benefit to the community versus the individual? If that make sense.
Pierre:  You talk about resilience but resilience is important for everybody. I believe the answer is in cooperation. Resilience is important but we need cooperation. I give you the example of Galileo that we are building and which will be available very soon.
We need to cooperate between system of cooperation between GPS and Galileo to make sure actually that you build the resilience. Not in the US, you don't need to create so good a GPS system in the US. You need to create a system as well and to have contacts and to build things.
It's the same also in the private sector. For instance, during this interesting week, we meet people, actually, in different companies, completely independent but they decided to have a sub‑partnership, for instance, for antennas to make sure that they don't build two times the antennas and to build resilience but they use each other's antennas to build, mutually, resilience.
I believe the answer is, "We need resilience because it's clear that space and the use of space is fundamental and will continue to be fundamental." Imagine a world where space will stop functioning, where we no longer get those data coming from space. We would not get satellite navigation.
We need resilience. But again, the answer is not necessarily to build resilience by one person, one country but the answer is to have more cooperation to create resilience.
Dr. Simpson:  Other comments from the panel? General Peña?
Lt. Gen. Peña:  It could be a problem of equipment system, money. But as Chile is a beginner in this space area, I think it is also very important to have the people to think, "What is the meaning of resilience? What is the meaning of space? What is the meaning to use the space? What is the advantage to have the assets in space?"
I believe with the people, I'm talking about the conscience of the people, in order to get the idea, they will vote, they will decide finally what we can do. For us, it's very important to have that. You have to work in the inner part of the country together with the civil side, legal side, private side all together with resilience.
Dr. Simpson:  Yes, Mike?
Lt. Col. Hellmann:  I guess resilience is now important to [inaudible 49:17]. However, it seems to me that there are various perspectives you can look at this topic, which is from the technical standpoint, from the policy standpoint from, or from an operational standpoint.
From my feeling, this is more a system of systems that covers not only space systems in space, it covers also ground systems and as an alternative that we can put together for the military to conduct operations under a harsh environment. This is from the military standpoint.
Probably, from a business standpoint, it covers more than a financial aspect, additionally in this, or a standpoint of a legal framework, also in this. Sometimes, probably, we took this word "resilience" and talking about it but we are talking probably about different approaches.
From my perspective, it is a broader system of systems, multi‑dimensional, or whatever you call it, thinking or mindset that covers this word "resilience". This is more behind than robustness, I think. Therefore, it's an important question you raised so far. On which level we are talking about resilience? The answers can be different.
Dr. Simpson:  Yes?
Audience Member:  Question to Lieutenant Colonel Hellman. How do you successfully fill the gaps between the civilian side and the military side and if not successful enough then what is remaining challenges on your view? Thank you.
[pause 51:46]
Lt. Col. Hellmann:  This question as far as I understood is also not so easy to answer, because we were very successful in formulating our space strategy. This is a success itself because it was an interagency coordination necessary.
In daily operations, we can cover both sides, the military side with the German Air Force and we can the civilian side that is closely linked to European SST Support program. We have in one governance model, I would say, two perspectives together, civilian.
Because SSA, or space debris, or space junk collision avoidance is not only a military issue. It is more a civilian issue than a military issue, because military space in Germany is one‑third, one‑fifth, of the whole engagement of the German government.
This is an advantage we now, or, this advantage arrives now in discussions with partners, also with our US colleagues, that we can deal and tackle both sides of the matter, the civil and military ones. Close in cooperation with USSTRATCOM, for example. Close in cooperation with our partners Italy, Spain, the Brits, and France, of course, Jean, in the European environment.
I think this is an advantage or success itself to come with the civilian mindset and the military one, which is something really different sometimes, together and have one objective. This objective is, secure our space infrastructure. I hope this answered so far your question.
Dr. Simpson:  I think we've come to that point where I need to fulfill my commitment to the Space Foundation and make sure that you don't miss your chance to hear the next featured speaker over in the International Center. Buzz Aldrin is scheduled and of course it's always quite an opportunity to hear Buzz and to see a person who continues to represent space in the way he does.
On behalf of Secure World Foundation, I want to thank you very much for being here. Many of you know us. You know our commitment to seek cooperative solutions to space sustainability. I think as you attend more and more of these events you'll understand how complex we see space sustainability. It involves resilience.
It certainly involves the kind of cooperative calls you've heard here in the panel that we live on an oblate spheroid, we're not going to solve this in a political‑geography way, we're going to have to solve many of the challenges of security as a species and increasingly we are seeing evidence of that.
Certainly congratulations to you, Elliott, for building the international timbre of the whole symposium, but also gathering people to speak where we share a passion for space, a passion for humanity, and need to see a way to build that kind of bridge.
Congratulations. I've been watching and participating in this now for a dozen years and you've made some rather extraordinary progress, so we really thank you for that.
I do want to simply call out and identify two people who are here. Many of you know our staff. I don't want to hold you longer by identifying everybody. But our Founder and Board President is here, Cynda Collins Arsensault.
[applause]
Dr. Simpson:  As I love to say, whether this was part of her decision or not at the time she founded Secure World Foundation, the amount of money she invested could have taken her to a week's vacation on the Space Station.
[laughter]
Dr. Simpson:  She instead invested in space sustainability for the future of a people that are increasingly dependent in space. Thank you, Cynda. Certainly a rather remarkable commitment.
We also have a member of our advisory committee, who was here. Oh, Jim has had to bolt. That's what happens when you have a two‑star general retiree who's on your advisory committee. Air Force people tend to take off from time to time.
[laughter]
Dr. Simpson:  In any event, thank you all for being here, because beyond these formal relationships, there is the informal relationship we have with each and every one of you that brings ideas to the table, that keeps us on track, that sends me messages that are often quite complimentary and occasionally sting a little bit.
That's OK, because what we want is not just a dialogue but a real culture of communication about the issues. What does it take to make sure that our grandkids have access to space that enables them to be more innovative than we have been, to be more effective than we have been, and to understand that sustainability is about momentum as much as it's about a single static condition?
Thank you for coming and we hope that this session has proved to be useful. If you've got the app, let us know how you rate the session. Thank you very much.
[applause]

Transcription by CastingWords